By Gillian Schutte
The Mail & Guardian article by Faizel Patel, “SA warns of economic shock as Iran war expands,” frames the unfolding conflict primarily through the language of economic disruption and diplomatic concern. Oil markets, fertiliser supply chains and inflation risks dominate the analysis. War appears as an economic disturbance to be managed.
Yet the political question that produced the conflict remains central and cannot be treated as background. The war began when the United States and launched coordinated strikes on and assassinated the country’s supreme leader during ongoing negotiations. No international legal doctrine recognises the targeted killing of a national leader in another sovereign state as legitimate conduct.
Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity of another state. When the initial act of war violates that principle, the legal landscape of the conflict changes fundamentally. The responding state enters the terrain of self-defence recognised under Article 51 of the same charter.
Iran’s retaliation must therefore be understood within that framework. Tehran has stated that its missile and drone strikes target military infrastructure connected to the assault on Iranian territory. In this context the war did not widen because of Iranian aggression. It widened because the original attack relied on a regional network of military bases.
The article refers to Iranian strikes on installations in neighbouring Gulf countries and presents them as evidence of escalation. Yet many of the installations involved are United States military bases operating from the territory of those states. These facilities formed part of the operational architecture used in the initial bombing campaign against Iran.
Under the logic of armed conflict, a military installation used to launch attacks becomes a legitimate military target. Iran’s position follows that reasoning. States that host foreign military infrastructure used in a strike on another country cannot claim complete neutrality once that infrastructure becomes part of the battlefield.
If a government allows its territory to harbour military bases used to attack another sovereign nation, it enters the conflict whether it intends to or not. Iran therefore maintains that countries hosting the military camps involved in the bombing of Iran cannot expect immunity from the consequences of that war.
The diplomatic debate surrounding the conflict reflects these contradictions. The adopted a resolution condemning Iranian attacks on Gulf states. Russia and China abstained. Their abstention did not endorse the war. It signalled refusal to legitimise a resolution that condemned retaliation while remaining silent about the strikes that triggered the conflict.
The imbalance reveals a broader pattern in the operation of the international system. When powerful Western states initiate military force, institutional responses tend to emphasise restraint from the country under attack rather than accountability for the initiators of violence.
Iran’s ambassador to South Africa, framed the matter clearly. No state can accept a world in which foreign powers reserve the right to bomb its territory, assassinate its leadership and expect the targeted country to remain passive.
The humanitarian consequences described in the article reinforce the gravity of the initial assault. Iranian authorities report more than 1 300 civilian deaths and widespread damage to homes, schools and hospitals. Such figures remind readers that modern air campaigns rarely remain confined to military objectives.
South Africa’s response, articulated by , reflects Pretoria’s attempt to maintain diplomatic balance by criticising both the original strikes and Iran’s retaliation. The position speaks to South Africa’s effort to navigate an increasingly fractured international order while maintaining relations with multiple global powers.
Yet balance can sometimes obscure sequence. When a war begins with an assassination and a bombing campaign during diplomatic negotiations, the chronology matters.
The killing of Iran’s supreme leader represented an extraordinary escalation. Officials in Washington and Tel Aviv appear to have expected the assassination to destabilise Iran’s political system. Instead the country’s Assembly of Experts rapidly appointed a successor and the state structure stabilised.
The outcome highlights a recurring miscalculation in regime-change strategies. External actors often underestimate the institutional resilience of states shaped by revolutionary history and national mobilisation.
For the Global South the implications extend beyond the Middle East. If powerful states can assassinate foreign leaders during negotiations and justify the act through geopolitical rivalry, the principle of sovereign equality collapses.
The Mail & Guardian article warns of economic shock, rising oil prices and supply disruptions. These concerns are valid. Yet the deeper shock lies elsewhere. The international order now confronts a moment in which military power increasingly overrides the legal framework meant to regulate it.
Iran did not initiate the war that now spreads across the region. It responded to an attack carried out against its territory and leadership.
The distinction remains essential if international law is to retain any meaning at all.
